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ABSTRACT 
U.S. farmers’ interest in CRP has waned. Enrollment for 2015 was targeted at 26 million 
acres but as of the end of February, actual enrollment had declined to 24.6 million acres (USDA, 
2015). Available studies point to recent fluctuations in commodity prices as a predominant factor 
in this enrollment gap. Other potentially influencing factors remain understudied, including 
farmer preferences for contract design. A choice experiment survey was conducted in the Prairie 
Pothole region to assess these preferences. An exploded logit model was used to evaluate the 
preference heterogeneity among program attributes. Results indicate that an increase in the 
maximum payment, length of contract, and the government’s share of establishment cost 
increase the utility of farmers, whereas, fixing terms at the beginning of the contract and 
imposing more land use restrictions on enrolled land have a negative impact on farmers’ utilities. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1. Introduction 
Land retirement programs have a long history in the United States. They were initiated in 
the 1930s in response to decreasing commodity prices. By removing land from production, these 
programs met the objectives of supporting commodity prices by reducing agricultural supply and 
stimulating agricultural conservation. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is an example 
of such a program. It too had an initial focus on commodity price support although, over time, 
objectives have shifted to conservation. 
“CRP is designed to establish long-term conservation covers and local ecosystem 
improvements on American farmland. The program pays producers a rental payment for 
establishing long-term plant cover to improve water quality, control soil erosion, and improve 
wildlife habitat. CRP enrollment is voluntary, the contract duration is from 10 to 15 years, and 
most contracts are awarded through competition” (Ferris and Siikamäki, 2009, P.2).  
Administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the CRP has a current 
enrollment of 24.3 million acres on 365,000 farms. Enrollment has been affected by fluctuations 
in commodity markets. For example, in 2007-2008, mounting commodity prices increased the 
opportunity cost of placing land in long-term land retirement programs and henceforth affected 
landowners’ enrollment decisions. In fact, CRP acreage decreased 17.1 million acres between 
FY2007 and FY2014 (Stubbs, 2014). Currently, the policy stipulates an enrollment cap of 24 
million by FY2018
1
. A federal budget savings of $3.3 billion dollars over the next ten years is 
anticipated as a result of the reduced enrollment cap. However, this comes at a cost to include 
loss of benefits associated with improved wildlife habitat, prevented erosion, and reduced carbon 
                                                          
1
 CRP acreage enrollment cap decreases to no more than 27.5 million acres in FY2014; 26 million acres in FY2015; 
25 million acres in FY2016; and 24 million acres in FY2017 and FY2018 (Stubbs, 2014). 
2 
 
sequestered in soils after land is re-introduced to production. Maximum benefits are provided by 
those lands which remain under a land retirement program for the longest period (Farm Service 
Agency, 2014). 
Anticipating this crisis, authors have contributed to the literature by suggesting 
modifications for the CRP. For example, Secchi and Babcock (2007) used the 
Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model to estimate the environmental impact of 
rising corn and soybean prices on the return of CRP to production status in Iowa. They 
concluded that under higher commodity prices, either a substantial increase in budget would be 
required to maintain the current level of environmental benefits or a targeted approach for 
maximizing the cost/benefit ratio from land retirement programs would be necessary. Baker and 
Galik (2009) also studied the impact of higher crop prices and increasing land returns on CRP 
acreage. They concluded that several modifications in the program would be required to increase 
income flow from CRP lands to maintain enrollment, such as allowing the sale of carbon-offset 
credits.  
Roberts and Lubowski (2007) noted that land on which farming is more profitable has a 
higher probability of contract cancellation and of land conversion back to production after 
contract expiration. To overcome the problem of resulting acreage reductions, they suggested 
that a onetime signing bonus should be provided to new enrollees because opportunity costs are 
higher for newly enrolled land than for re-enrolled land. This first-time premium could be more 
effective if it varied according to the likelihood that land will remain out of production after the 
contract expires. Finally, Roberts and Lubowski highlighted the fact that CRP land with trees 
and/or wildlife practices were about half as likely to return to crop production as lands covered 
with grasses and/or legumes. Based on this finding they concluded that, in order to achieve 
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environmental goals cost-effectively, greater focus should be conferred on tree-planting and 
wildlife benefits.  
Wu (2000) identified another major issue affecting the effectiveness of CRP, its tendency 
to bring non-cropland into crop production, known as slippage. High commodity prices 
associated with reduced production on CRP land, and substitution effects
2
 are the two major 
reasons for slippage.  
Several other studies, discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, investigated the 
characteristics, motivations, beliefs, and attitudes of CRP contract holders. However, none of the 
CRP-specific literature has considered the impact of these factors on landowner utility or on their 
likelihood of (re) enrolling. In fact, because choices with tradeoffs were not explicitly 
investigated, previous research may overstate the importance of various factors to the 
landowners and, in general, does not allow estimation of the relative importance of their 
priorities. One exception is Lambert et al. (2006a; 2006b) who predicted the likelihood of 
participating in a land retirement program using actual behaviors rather than stated or intended 
behavior. 
Against this background, the focus of the current study was to investigate farmers’ 
responses to alternative designs of CRP program contracts by identifying the effects of contract 
attributes on farmer preferences. This study follows up on findings from the literature that, in 
order to keep this program competitive, viable, and working towards its intended goals, CRP 
payments must keep pace with rising farmland rental rates. This is accomplished by investigating 
the extent to which farmers are willing to trade off payments for less restrictive program 
requirements. 
                                                          
2
 When some cropland is taken out of production, farmers may substitute other land for crop production because of 
scale economies and fixed input costs 
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The study was conducted in the Prairie Pothole Region (PPR; Figure 1.1) of the United 
States including parts of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota and Iowa. The PPR 
is the most important waterfowl production area in North America, covering approximately 
185,000 square miles of wetlands. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Prairie Pothole Region of United States 
 
Source: USDA, http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/pothole/2008/all_states.pdf 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Efficacy of conservation programs depends on preserving the environmentally sensitive 
land and participation of the producers/owners of such land. Return per acre is the most 
significant factor for any producer and many input decisions are based on the output potential of 
scarce resources although other factors also play a role. Policy makers would benefit from an 
enhanced understanding of how farmers make land use decisions about their scarce land, which 
factors affect their willingness to accept CRP contracts, and how they would react to future 
program changes. 
In this study, a quantitative model was applied to understand and identify the important 
attributes to the farmers’ decision to enroll or not to enroll in the CRP. In particular, we identify 
how contract specifications influencing the decision of farmers’ willingness to participate, 
5 
 
identify the heterogeneity of preferred level of attributes within defined subsets and draw 
conclusions based on the suggestions and feedback received 
The empirical analysis is based on the discrete choice experiments (DCE) completed by 
76 farmers from family farms during 2014. The DCE allows us to understand the effects of 
different contract attributes. It also allows evaluation of tradeoffs that farmers are willing to 
make between rental payment and other terms of the contract. Statistical regression analysis was 
constructed to identify heterogeneity of the economic and socio-economic factors by using an 
exploded logit model, which is described more in more detail in chapter 3. This analysis will 
assist both policy makers and producers involved by evaluating the important factors that could 
change current characteristics, policies, and effectiveness of the CRP. 
1.3. Research Objectives 
The research objectives of this study are as follow: 
i. Examine preferred levels of attributes for the CRP 
ii. Identify how these different attributes affect the decision of farmers to enroll in 
CRP 
iii. Identify socio-economic characteristics and attitudes that impact farmers’ 
preferences, and 
iv. Estimate willingness to tradeoff (WTT) between rental payments and other 
contract attributes. 
1.4. Operational Definitions of Terms and Acronyms 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP): A voluntary long-term cropland diversion 
program administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA). In this program, USDA establishes 
contracts with farmers to set aside their highly erodible or environmentally sensitive croplands, 
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for conservation use, in exchange for financial and technical assistance. Long-term program 
goals are to improve water quality, prevent soil erosion, and reduce loss of wildlife habitat. 
Farm Bill: A comprehensive omnibus multi-year bill, authorizing legislation pertaining to 
agriculture and food programs under the purview of the USDA. 
Natural Resources Conservation Services: The Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS), formerly known as the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), is an agency of the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that provides technical assistance to farmers and 
private landowners. 
Environmental Benefits Index: The Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) is an index used 
by FSA to evaluate and rank farmers’ land on the basis of expected environmental benefits to 
soil resources, water quality, wildlife habitat, and other resource concerns for enrollment in the 
CRP during a general signup.  
Local Maximum: A local maximum value is the highest value of a function within a small 
interval hence there could be more than one local maximum within the entire domain. 
Global Maximum: A global maximum is the highest value of the function within the 
entire domain and there can only be a single global maximum within that domain. 
1.5. Summary 
The Conservation Reserve Program is one of more than twenty voluntary conservation 
programs in the United States. Changes in agricultural commodity markets necessarily affect 
land retirement programs, and make their management challenging. The PPR is a rich habitat of 
many species. About half of the prairie potholes and surrounding grasslands have been converted 
for production, raising alarm among the conservation community. The purpose of this study was 
to analyze and assess the most significant parameters affecting farmers’ decisions on CRP 
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enrollment by developing and analyzing hypothetical choice sets. Contemporary research on this 
subject does not allow for assessment of the tradeoffs between program attributes.   
The CRP is a federal program employed locally. There have been very limited provisions 
to analyze the effectiveness of the program locally. For policy makers, the results will also help 
in providing more information about PPR farm operators so as to improve the balance, efficiency 
and effectiveness of the CRP. Furthermore, understanding what is important to farmers will help 
to target educational effects.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Since the inception of CRP in 1985, evolution in guidelines and advancement in 
technology, along with fluctuating market conditions, have endured as factors affecting 
producer’s enrollment decisions. This review covers literature focusing on producer decision-
making in the areas of land use and conservation.   
Academic, scholarly, historical and industry literature were reviewed. Additionally, 
government publications relating to conservation programs and farm bills were studied. The 
initial focus was on the evolution of land-retirement programs. Second, consideration focused on 
the influence of commodity prices on CRP enrollment.  Finally, the literature regarding factors 
affecting conservation decisions is discussed. 
2.2. The Conservation Reserve Program: Brief Review 
The Conservation Reserve Program was initiated with the passage of the Food Security 
Act of 1985 and was reauthorized in all subsequent farm bills (Wu and Weber, 2012). It is a 
voluntary, long-term cropland diversion program under management of the USDA. In this 
program, farmers voluntarily set aside their environmentally sensitive cropland with appropriate 
cropping history in exchange for monetary and other benefits (e.g., technical assistance) for 10 to 
15 years. 
Although CRP was not established until the mid-1980s, government involvement in 
cropland diversion has a much longer history. As noted in Chapter 1, the first program was 
initiated in the early 1930s with the purpose of controlling over-production. Later, objectives 
were expanded towards reducing soil erosion and increasing availability of water for agriculture. 
In 1956, a Soil Bank Program was instituted that paid farmers to retire their farm land from 
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production for 3 to 10 years with the main purpose of supply reduction of the six basic crops:-
wheat, corn, cotton, tobacco, rice, and peanuts (erodible land was not targeted) (Helms, 1985). In 
1983, the government launched the Payment in Kind (PIK) program to idle cropland. This was 
only for a short period and the focus was again to manage supply. 
The aforementioned early efforts set the roots for what is today the CRP. In the 1985 
farm bill, many changes were made to the guidelines of its predecessor programs. The length of 
the contract was increased from 3 years to periods of 10 or 15 years. The purpose was also 
modified and prevention of soil erosion became its primary goal. Secondary objectives were to 
manage over-production of commodities, support farm incomes, preserve long-term capacity to 
produce food and fiber, reduce sedimentation, improve water quality, and create fish and wild 
life habitat.  
Overtime, the program has evolved in every farm bill. The Food and Agricultural 
Conservation and Trade Act (1990) broadened eligibility of CRP to include more 
environmentally-sensitive land and expanded existing primary goals of reducing soil erosion and 
improving soil quality to include improving wildlife habitat and water quality (Jacobs, Thurman 
and Marra, 2011). In 1991, the bidding procedure was changed. The Environmental Benefits 
Index (EBI)3 was employed to rank bids, and a maximum rental rate was determined based on 
comparable cropland (Soil and Water Conservation Foundation and Environmental Defense 
Fund, 2008). The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 added wildlife 
habitat to the EBI and provided other options for farmers to participate (Kirwan, Lubowski and 
Roberts, 2005). It allowed early termination of contracts with the exception of filter-strips, 
                                                          
3
 The EBI ranks CRP offers by weighing program costs for enrolling land in CRP against six environmental 
objectives (wildlife habitat, water quality, erosion control, enduring benefits, air quality, and state or national 
conservation priority areas) (Cattaneo et al, 2002). 
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waterways, strips adjacent to riparian areas, and highly-sensitive or highly-erodible land 
(O’Brien, 2003). In 1997, the USDA established the Conservation Reserve Enhancement 
Program (CREP), a partnership among producers and state and federal governments. In this 
program, the USDA funds part of the program and states provide the remaining funds. The 
program was designed to encourage farm conservation practices that meet specific state and 
national conservation and environmental objectives (Farm Service Agency, Undated). Under the 
2002 Farm Bill, the cropping history requirement for land eligibility for CRP enrollment was 
increased and changes were made related to contract extension and re-enrollment. A requirement 
was added that there is an equitable balance between program objectives. The eligibility 
requirement was once again changed in the 2008 Farm Bill. Changes in this legislation included 
(i) a reduced total enrollment cap from 39.2 million acres in 2009 to 32 million in 2010-2012, (ii) 
the addition of a local preference criteria, (iii) authorization for the USDA secretary to waive the 
25% of county cap, (iv) allowance that currently enrolled land be automatically considered for 
re-enrollment, and (v) a requirement that the USDA post rental rates. The Agriculture Act of 
2014 reduced the maximum allowable CRP enrollment from 32 million to 24 million over the 
five-year life of the bill. It allows contract holders, with certain land classes, to terminate 
contracts in fiscal year 2015 if the land has already been enrolled for at least five years. 
2.3. CRP Implementation 
CRP is administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) under USDA, with technical 
support from the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and other USDA-controlled 
agencies (Stubbs, 2014). There are two ways to enroll: general sign-up and continuous sign-up. 
Combined enrollment is restricted to no more than 25 million acres at any given time in FY2015. 
General sign-up is competitive, and is only open on specific dates, during which landowners can 
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submit bids defining the rental rate amount at which they would accept a contract. Bids are then 
ranked based on EBI. As of March 2015, 75% of total CRP lands, comprising 18.2 million acres, 
were enrolled under general sign-up contracts. This includes 239,209 contracts on 164,790 
farms. Environmentally-sensitive land devoted to certain conservation practices may be enrolled 
in CRP at any time under continuous sign-up. Unlike the general sign-up process, offers are 
automatically accepted, provided the land and producer meet certain eligibility requirements. 
Acceptance is not subject to competitive bidding. As of February 2015, 6.1 million acres—25% 
of total CRP lands—were enrolled under continuous sign-up. This 25% acreage also includes 
acreage enrolled under two sub-programs, 1.2 million acres enrolled in the Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program (CREP) and 354,473 acres in the Farmable Wetland Program.  
To be eligible for CRP enrollment, a producer must have owned or operated the land for 
at least 12 months prior to the close of the CRP sign-up period, unless: “(i) the new owner 
acquired the land due to the previous owner’s death, (ii) the ownership change occurred due to 
foreclosure where the owner exercised a timely right or redemption in accordance with state law, 
or (iii) the circumstances of the acquisition present adequate assurance to FSA that the new 
owner did not acquire the land for the purpose of placing it in CRP” (FSA Fact Sheet, 2014, p, 2)  
2.4. Eligible Land 
USDA may consider the following land types for enrollment: 
 “Highly erodible cropland that: (i) if untreated could substantially reduce the land’s 
future agricultural production capability or (ii) cannot be farmed in accordance with a 
conservation plan; and has a cropping history or was considered to be planted for four of 
the six years preceding February 7, 2014 (except for land previously enrolled in CRP); or 
is marginal pasture land devoted to appropriate vegetation for water quality purposes”; 
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 “Grasslands that: (i) contain forbs or shrubland on which grazing is the predominant use; 
(ii) are located in an area historically dominated by grasslands; and (iii) could provide 
habitat for ecologically significant animal and plant populations if restored or retained in 
its current condition.”  
 “Cropland that is otherwise ineligible, if it is determined that: (i) if permitted to remain in 
agricultural production, it would contribute to the degradation of soil, water, or air 
quality; (ii) the land is a newly created, permanent grass sod waterway, or a contour grass 
sod strip; (iii) the land will be devoted to newly established living snow fences, 
permanent wildlife habitat, windbreaks, shelterbelts, or filter strips or riparian buffers 
devoted to trees or shrubs; (iv) the land poses an off-farm environmental threat; or (v) 
enrollment of the land would facilitate a net savings in groundwater or surface water 
resources; or certain land enrolled as a riparian buffer or for similar water quality 
purposes” (Stubbs, 2014, p.3). 
2.5. Commodity Prices and the Conservation Reserve Program 
Fluctuating agricultural commodity prices have always been a challenge for management 
of long-term land retirement programs. For example, in 2007, CRP acreage reached its peak of 
almost 37 million but surging commodity prices during the 2007–2008 marketing year were in 
large part responsible for a 2.1 million acre decrease in CRP acreage in a short span of 12 
months. In the PPR region alone, more than 1 million acres were removed that year.  
Some of the major factors likely responsible for the decline include (i) changes in 
program priorities, (ii) advancement of farming technologies, and (iii) changes in producer’s 
preference due to availability of various alternative subsidy-based programs. However, there is 
general agreement that the most important one was the unprecedented increase in commodity 
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prices and subsequent increase in income from farming (Stubbs, 2014 and Rashford, Walker and 
Bastian, 2010).   
Roger (2011) mentioned when high commodity prices persist in the long run, a two-fold 
issue is created. First is the increase in commodity prices themselves. Farmers are assumed to be 
profit-maximizing. The gap between CRP rental payments net of associated costs and 
prospective profits earned from farming is sufficient incentive to return land under expiring 
contracts to production. A second problem emerges when the government updates the rules and 
guidelines of CRP as a result of shifts in price. Subsequently, acreage under expiring CRP 
contracts is not renewed or extended. This also results in farmers bringing their environmentally-
sensitive land into production. 
 
Figure 2.1. Yearly CRP enrollment from 1986 to 2014 
 
Source: Data collected from USDA
4
  
Cooper and Osborn (1998) investigated the impact of changes in rental rates on existing 
CRP contract holders and on re-enrollment decisions, considering CRP rental rates as an 
                                                          
4 http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=DATA_STATISTICS 
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opportunity cost. In their study, CRP contract holders were asked about their willingness to 
extend their current contract under two hypothetical scenarios. In the first case, they were given 
an option to get ‘X’ percent of their current payment for an extension of their current contract for 
another 10 years but were not allowed to hay or graze the land. In a second case, the payment 
was changed to ‘Y’ percent with an option of haying and grazing allowed only after mid-July. 
They found that CRP rental rate had a positive and strong effect on farmers’ willingness to 
extend their contracts. There was a large and significant difference in preference for the haying 
and/or grazing option between farmers with livestock and those without livestock. Livestock 
farmers were willing to accept lower rental rates if haying and/or grazing was permitted, whereas 
those without livestock required higher rental payments if grazing was permitted. Other 
independent variables such as farm income, market value of adjacent land and erosion rate on 
CRP land prior to its enrollment reduced the likelihood of contract re-enrollment.  
Secchi and Babcock (2007) modeled the effects of rising corn and soybean prices on the 
return of CRP to production in Iowa. They constructed CRP supply curves by estimating whether 
land enrolled in CRP would earn more by remaining in the program or by returning to production 
under various corn prices, assuming soybean prices remained at $4 per bushel. These supply 
curves for CRP were constructed with the corn prices ranging from $2 to $5 per bushel. Sechi 
and Babcock estimated that an increase in corn prices to $3 would result in conversion of a 
million acres of Iowa’s CRP land into production, while an increase to $5 per bushel would 
result in about a 70,000 acres shift of Iowa’s CRP acres into production. They concluded that 
there is a need for higher CRP program payments in order to reverse the effect of high 
commodity prices. 
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Gill‐Austern (2011) employed a series of models to evaluate the impact of corn prices, 
corn yield, state GNP, and corn acreage on CRP enrollments within the Corn Belt region 
(Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio and Kansas) from 1986 to 2010. Increasing 
corn prices generally preceded reduced CRP enrollment, and, depending on the model, these 
estimated decreases ranged from 135,000 to 250,000 acres (estimated to be between 13 and 22% 
of enrolled acres) over a three‐year, lagged impact window. Corn yields did not contribute to 
model efficacy, and results for state GNP were mixed, although they favored an inverse 
relationship with CRP enrollments. The author points out short‐term spikes in prices are not 
likely to impact CRP enrollment levels, whereas the data reveal that after the three‐year period, 
impacts of consistently high commodity prices are statistically discernible.  
Hellerstein and Malcolm (2011) undertook the most comprehensive examination of the 
effects of changing prices and other factors on CRP enrollment. They looked at the cost of 
maintaining 32 million CRP acres as targeted in the 2008 Farm Bill. They used a likely-to-bid 
model (LTB) for predicting the effects on acreage if the program was started from scratch and all 
enrollment signups were done at one time and an opt-out model for analyzing which contracts 
would withdraw from their current contract under varying commodity prices, ethanol policy, and 
CRP rental payments. They found that it would require doubling the rental rates in order to enroll 
enough acreage to provide the same environmental benefits that were generated by existing CRP 
contracts at the time. They predicted that, if government spending did not increase or remained 
constant; landowners would start looking for some more lucrative alternatives for their profitable 
(but environmentally sensitive) land, resulting in reduced benefits provided from enrolled acres. 
McLaughlin et al. (2002) examined the consequences of bringing CRP land into 
production due to increased bioenergy crop production. They found that 13.3 million acres 
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would be removed from CRP if prices of switch grass reached $47.50. Baker and Galik (2009) 
mentioned a couple of ways to prevent the land coming out from CRP for crop production. First, 
they suggested providing additional compensation in those years where commodity prices are 
extremely high resulting in higher profits from farming, and second, allowing the sale of carbon 
credits. 
2.6. Producers and CRP Decision 
Other studies have analyzed the impact of participant characteristics, motivations, beliefs, 
and attitudes on CRP enrollment. Hatley et al. (1989) examined socioeconomic characteristics of 
CRP holders in 11 counties of the Texas High Plains. Participants were randomly selected and 
were interviewed on the basis of age, education, occupation, tenure, operation size, and operation 
type. They found older farmers (64 years and above) were more interested in participating in 
CRP than younger farmers (44 years or less). Age, full ownership, and part-time farming were 
positively correlated with CRP participation but operations with 140 acres or less (small farmers) 
hardly participated. Mortensen et al. (1990) applied a similar approach in North Dakota and they 
found a positive correlation between age, farming as a primary occupation, and decisions 
regarding participation in a CRP contract. 
Soule et al. (2000) studied data on 941 U.S. corn producers to analyze the effect of land 
tenure on the adoption of conservation practices. The variables used in their study were 
conservation practice type, farm size, operator characteristics, land erodibility, annual 
precipitation, average temperature and regional location. They found that tenure had a positive 
effect on conservation practice adoption and owners were interested to adopt practices that 
provide benefits only over the longer term (grassed waterways, strip-cropping, and contour 
farming). 
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Lambert et al. (2006a) examined numerous conservation programs that included the CRP, 
Water Reserve Program (WRP), Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), and 
Conservation Security Program (CSP). The EQIP is a conservation program in which 
participants receive financial and technical assistance to implement conservation practices, some 
of which are also allowed under CRP (e.g. riparian buffers), and others that are not (e.g. waste 
storage, water tanks). The CSP program is designed to provide financial incentives for 
maintaining and improving participants’ existing conservation systems. Lambert et al. (2007a) 
found positive relationships between percentage of land enrolled under conservation programs 
and farming experience, government payments to value of production, use of land under these 
programs and female operators. However, presence of grain crops and highly valued crops were 
inversely related and no association was found between percentage of land enrolled under a 
retirement program and high value crops, household size, a farm birthright, location proxemics to 
a water source or environmentally sensitive land, or the presence of a highly erodible land index. 
In a follow-up paper, Lambert et al. (2007b) examined the effect of farm structure, farm 
household characteristics, and operator attributes on CRP enrollment. Farm structure 
characteristics included total cropland acres, percentage of acres owned to acres operated, 
percentage of revenue from crop production, and government and CRP payments per acre. The 
farm household characteristics were percentage of off-farm income to total household income 
and percentage of less than 18 years of age living in the household. Human capital characteristics 
included number of years in farming experience and education. Results showed that CRP 
payments and farm size were positively related with the amount of land enrolled under CRP.  
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2.7. Slippage 
A major issue affecting the effectiveness of the efficiency of conservation programs in 
meeting program objectives is the tendency to replace acres enrolled in a conservation reserve 
program with non-cropland in crop production. This is referred to as slippage. Wu (2000) 
identified two reasons for slippage. First is a price effect, when some cropland may be brought 
into production because of increased commodity prices associated with less supply of such 
commodities in market. Another reason for slippage is substitution effects. When some cropland 
is taken out of production, farmers may substitute non-farming or marginal land for crop 
production because of scale economies and fixed input effects. 
 One potential limitation of Wu’s analysis is that it does not anticipate the effect of 
increased supply on price of similar commodities to feed back into land-use decisions. That is, if 
land will be brought into production, this would increase supply and reduce commodity prices, 
further lowering expected revenue from all affected crops. This situation would discourage some 
farmers from planting these crops. If this happens, the national and state estimates of production 
and revenue impacts may be over- or understated, depending on interregional shifts in 
cultivation. This is slippage in reverse. For many years, research contradicted the claim of 
supply-control phenomena of land retirement programs. The contradiction was attributed to the 
price effect; farmers are motivated to bring marginal and/or uncultivated land into production 
that ultimately increases supply (Sullivan et al., 2004). A number of authors have claimed that 
ignoring slippage effects would result in an overestimation of acreage control benefits by 20 to 
over 50 percent, depending greatly upon type of crop, land quality, and location. However, 
others have found that the actual slippage effects may be lower than claimed (Hoag et al., 1993; 
Roberts and Bucholtz, 2005). If reverse slippage follows a similar pattern, CRP land coming into 
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production in one area may cause non-CRP land to drop out of production in other areas. 
Sullivan et al. (2004) suggested that to estimate the approximate correct size of slippage due to 
changes in commodity prices, an analysis should be made on effect on overall agricultural 
economy if CRP expired completely.  
2.8. Producers Attributes, Perceptions and Intentions 
Literature was considered which examined the determinants and effect of land use 
decisions after termination of CRP contracts. Land owners have an option between bringing back 
their land to non-conservation use or enrolling into any available voluntary programs (including 
re-enrolling into CRP). Johnson et al. (1997) conducted a survey in the Texas High Plains 
Region to identify and assess certain characteristics and attributes of participants and their land 
enrolled into a CRP contract. The survey was emailed to 740 contract holders. The response rate 
was 60 percent. Respondents were asked about characteristics of land (type of soil, availability of 
water), grazing potential, land use options if the contract will not be extended, reason for 
enrollment, and socio-demographic characteristics. 
Results of this survey showed participant’s interest in bringing back their CRP land into 
regular farming practices completely (44%) or partially (23%), subsequently impacting 69% of 
CRP acres amongst participants’ acreage. They also found that participants who had livestock in 
their operation and availability of water and fencing for their livestock were more interested in 
continuing their CRP contract with the purpose of grazing. Having land that was put in CRP 
because of economic factors or with loamy soil types, and education were positively correlated 
with the reenrollment decision. Participants who enrolled with productive ground wanted to 
bring back it to production.  
20 
 
Allen and Vanderever (2003) and Allen and Witter (2008) represent the most 
comprehensive approach to date. They employed a national survey of CRP participants. The 
focus of the 2003 study was to determine the social and environmental benefits of the program 
on the land, individual, and society. For their study, a mail survey was sent to 2,200 randomly 
selected CRP contract holders which were identified proportional to the incidence of regional 
contracts. The largest category of respondents was retirees (52%). There were 1,419 responses 
resulting 64.5% response rate.  
Allen and Vanderever (2003) found that maximum participants cited control of soil 
erosion at first planting of CRP covers (nearly 85%) as a benefit. Drought was acknowledged as 
a failure of initial planting for some respondents (9%). Many respondents (over 73%) noticed an 
increase in wildlife population on the land and/or at adjacent land enrolled under CRP. An 
opportunity to observe wildlife was the most often environment benefit mentioned by 
respondents (over 59%). More than 80% of respondent believed that the CRP had contributed to 
greater numbers of wildlife and a very small percentage of respondents (less than 10%) did not 
perceive wildlife habitat as a priority. Improved water quality (39%), opportunities to personally 
hunt (38%), and scenic improvements to the farm or landscape (37%) also received mention by 
more than one third of respondents. Control of drifting snow (30%), improved air quality (29%), 
greater permanence to surface water (24%), potential increase in future income (17%), and an 
increase in opportunity to lease land for hunting (12%) were also mentioned. 
 Although roughly 25% of contractees reported no negative effects from the CRP, others 
reported CRP as a source of weeds (mentioned by 29% of respondents), a fire hazard (19%), or 
as a source of unwanted requests for hunting (18%). Appearance (unkempt; 13%), the attraction 
of unwanted wildlife (9%), and negative effects on the local economy (8%) were mentioned 
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along with reduction in production lands (4%). Management of CRP by the contractees differed 
by region. For example, those respondents from Mountain states clearly preferred grazing over 
alternatives (63%), compared with those in the Corn Belt whose interest in grazing was low 
(10%). Most respondents were, at that time, satisfied with the range of management alternatives 
available, although a significant number would have preferred more intensive management with 
an increased level of payment. 
 Allen and Witter (2008) examined the potential recreational use of CRP acres and 
possible opportunities of generating revenue from these recreational uses. Four thousand surveys 
were sent to randomly-selected CRP contractees and 74% (2,953) of participants responded.  
Respondents (57%) mentioned that some portions of their CRP acreages were used for 
many recreational activities. Of those mentioning use of CRP for recreation; hunting (89%) 
wildlife viewing (44%); hiking (23%); and fishing (7%) were the most popular activities. Of 
those who mentioned about recreational activities materializing on their land, over half (55%) 
mentioned that users included those of outside families and friends. A significant number of 
farmers (39%) mentioned that these users are from outside their local community plus users 
(22%) from outside the state as well. The money spent by these outsiders on some other 
activities might provide economic benefits to other local residents as well.  
Usage of CRP land varied among the landowners in the Midwest (61%), Plains states (51%), 
East (58%), and West (53%). Among those who allow recreation activities, landowners from the 
East were most likely (19%) and least likely from the Midwest (4%) to charge for recreation 
activities on their CRP land. Also, very few landowners from West and Plains states receive 
income from recreational activities as well. Overall they estimated that U.S. landowners were 
receiving $21.3 million from these recreational activities and if potential earnings of those who 
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do not charge any fee on their land were added than the expected market value of earning from 
recreational activities on CRP land would be at least $72.3 million. 
2.9. Summary 
Fluctuating agriculture commodity markets have long been a hindrance for long term 
land retirement programs and makes their management challenging. For example, in 2007, CRP 
acreage reached peak of just under 37 million but exponential surge food prices during 2007–
2008 triggered demands to reduce land retirements. Consequently, CRP acreage was reduced by 
2.1 million acres in a short span of 12 months of FY2008. In the PPR region alone, over one 
million acres were removed in that year. This stumble in CRP acreage continued and in the next 
seven years, CRP enrollment was reduced by 12.5 million acres from 36.8 to 24.3 million acres 
in FY 2014 (USDA). 
This chapter discussed findings from the literature regarding CRP. Four studies 
examining the impact of commodity prices on CRP enrollment and six other studies were 
incorporated which report on analyzes of the effect of participant characteristics, motivations, 
beliefs, and attitudes on CRP enrollment. 
Few other studies were included which highlighted that ignoring slippage effects, would 
result in an overestimation of acreage control benefits by 20 to over 50 percent, depending 
greatly upon type of crop, land quality, and location. However, other two studies determined this 
claim was an over estimation. Sullivan et al., (2004) suggested that in order to estimate the 
approximate size of CRP land returning to production due to change in commodity prices, an 
assessment should be based on the U.S. Regional Agricultural Sector Model (USMP); now the 
Regional Environment and Agriculture Programming Model (REAP).  
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In the last section of the chapter, other studies were discussed which examined the 
determinants and effect of land use decisions after their termination on conservation contract. 
These studies were majorly conducted with the help of surveys and they found that other than 
commodity prices, post-CRP use intentions will vary with characteristics of land, socio-
economic factors, and participants’ attitudes.  
In crux, many studies were included to understand how producers make decisions about 
CRP and attributes about efficiency of the program. However, in the capricious world where 
nothing is fixed and predictable for long, there is still a need to evaluate the different factors that 
are important from the producer’s side. This will provide an informed basis to educate decision 
makers on all aspects of available options for conservation programs which are likely to 
influence their enrollment decisions. Further in the study, chapter 3 will describe methods used 
in the study, chapter 4 will present results, and chapter 5 will focus on the policy 
recommendations. 
  
24 
 
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1. Introduction 
Various survey, experimental, and statistical methods have been applied to the problem 
of economic valuation of non-market goods. Contingent valuation surveys using binary or 
multinomial discrete choice experiments (DCEs) have been deployed by researchers through in-
person interviews, as well as via mail, phone, and online survey instruments (Christensen et al., 
2011; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). Data gathered by DCE survey methods are well-suited for 
econometric analysis using limited dependent variable techniques, such as heteroskedastic 
logistic modeling, logit scaling approach, multinomial logistic regression, mixed logit modeling, 
and random parameters logistic regression, which can be used to predict the probability of a 
particular decision from a set of possible decisions based on the attributes of the outcomes and/or 
the attributes of the decision maker(s) (Ruto and Garrod, 2009). Within the discipline of 
environmental economics, many studies have been conducted to investigate how producers and 
consumers evaluate environmental benefits of different policy initiatives (Adamowicz et al., 
1998; Boxall et al., 1996; Hanley et al., 1998; Garrod and Willis, 1999). In recent years, DCEs 
have been applied to evaluate farmers’ decisions about or preferences for land retirement 
programs or agro-environmental schemes (AES) (Ruto and Garrod, 2009; Christensen et al., 
2011; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Schulz et al., 2014)  
Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) used a random parameters logit model to evaluate the 
factors affecting farmers’ willingness to participate in AES, for the introduction of nitrogen 
fixing crops in dry land areas, in Spain. Farmers were asked to complete DCEs by choosing one 
of the three options—either one of the two hypothetical AES enrollment contracts with varied 
attributes, or not to enroll in the AES at all. Design attributes for the hypothetical contracts 
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included grazing permission, minimum enrolled area requirement, compulsory technical 
assistance and monitoring, and a fixed rental payment. Results showed eliminating the minimum 
enrollment area requirement and direct provision of technical assistance and monitoring 
increased respondents’ willingness to sign a contract.  
Christensen et al. (2011) collected data using DCE techniques, and used a random 
parameters logit model to estimate Danish farmers’ willingness to accept agro-environmental 
subsidy schemes to implement pesticide-free buffer zones. Farmers preferred contracts with a 
flexible zone width, short contract period, greater flexibility in use of fertilizers, and the option to 
quit the contract year to year. Ruto and Garrod (2009) used a mixed logit model and latent class 
model approach to analyze farmers’ willingness to participate in AES in 10 European 
countries—not including Denmark. They investigated farmer preferences for monetary 
compensation, contract length, flexibility of whole farm or partial farm being entered into the 
scheme, flexibility in undertaking some conservation practices, and time spent on 
paperwork/administration. Ducos et al. (2009) assessed the impact of compliance costs on 
farmers’ participation in AESs using a Tobit model. They found that the most significant barrier 
to entry for small farmer AES participation was fixed transaction costs, and suggested that 
modifying the payment structure by concurrently providing a higher lump sum payment upfront, 
and smaller annual rental payments, might decrease the government expenditure and 
simultaneously increase farm participation rates. Vanslembrouck et al. (2002) used the latent 
class model to investigate Belgian farmers’ preferences for increasing land-scape value. They 
identified a group of farmers who were simply not interested in participating in a voluntary 
agreement (even though they could set the price themselves). Another group of farmers was 
generally inclined to participate, and their willingness to participate increased if they were 
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informed about the environmental benefits involved. In spite of the valuable contribution of these 
papers, the latent class model has not been used much in evaluating farmers’ preferences in the 
classification of local agro-environmental policies in the U.S.A. The present study uses 
orthogonally-designed hypothetical DCE to investigate farmers’ preferences for alternative CRP 
contract provisions that could feasibly enter the design of real CRP contracts at some future date. 
In the following section, DCE methods are presented in detail, and then statistical methods for 
DCE analysis are explained  
3.2. Background 
A DCE consists of several orthogonally-designed choice sets, each of which presents two 
or more hypothetical decision alternatives. For each choice set, participants may be asked to 
select their most preferred alternative, or to rank the alternatives. Every decision alternative is 
defined by a group of attributes, which take on values that vary among the hypothetical 
alternatives (Street et al, 2005, Schulz et al., 2014). DCEs are a common tool for assessing 
people’s preferences and/or decisions in hypothetical situations. Use of DCEs is based on 
random utility theory. Rather than examining the entire scenario as a package, the choice 
experiment allows the researcher to determine how specific attributes of the alternatives affect 
respondents’ choices (Garrod and Willis, 1999). Systematic, orthogonal experimental design of 
the attribute levels in the choice sets is essential to the survey methodology. Otherwise, the 
researcher may find that the effects of the attributes (and marginal rates of substitution among 
them) are confounded by collinearity and therefore not statistically discernible (Mengoni, 2011,). 
Statistical analyses of DCEs with limited dependent variable models can be used to 
evaluate the overall importance of different attributes to program participants, as well as how the 
levels of these attributes affect participation rates levels. Per Lancsar and Savage (2004), DCEs 
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can be used to evaluate the importance of the attributes to the decision maker’s choice to 
participate, and/or the marginal rate of substitution at which the respondent is prepared to accept 
tradeoffs amongst these attributes. If appropriately designed, applied, analyzed, and interpreted, 
DCE methods offer a viable alternative or complement to other methods of valuation and 
preference elicitation, such as revealed preference methods and experimental auctions (Lancer 
and Louviere, 2008).  
During the 1970s and 1980s, conjoint analysis (CA) was considered for predicting and 
analyzing consumers’ decision-making and choice behavior. DCE sometimes gets confused with 
conjoint analysis (CA). The latter is based on conjoint measures, which are purely mathematical, 
and concerned with the behavior of number systems, rather than with human behavior or 
preferences. Unlike CA, random utility theory seeks to explain human decision making by 
modeling choices as a function of unobserved preferences (or utility). Other differences between 
CA and DCE methods include: (i) the treatment of error components and (ii) the feasibility of the 
alternatives included in the choice sets. Treatment of error components is an afterthought in CA, 
whereas it is the starting point in DCEs, which rely on random utility theory. Feasibility of at 
least one alternative in each choice set is required for valid DCE, whereas traditional CA choice 
sets sometimes offer respondents an entire set of infeasible (or unrealistic) alternatives (Louviere 
et al, 2010). 
The use of ranking and rating techniques suffers from theoretical and practical obstacles 
(Bennett and Blamey, 2001). These concerns include (i) the difficulty involved in making 
interpersonal comparisons of ranking or rating data, (ii) the difficulty for respondents to rank 
large numbers of alternatives, and (iii) the fact that rating tasks in particular involve a departure 
from contexts actually faced by decision makers. The greatest advantage of DCE is that by using 
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this method a low cognitive complexity arises —i.e. it is relatively simple (Louviere et al., 2000). 
Hence, DCEs are consistent with economic theories (Hamlet et al., 2001) and can simulate types 
of decisions that are familiar from respondents’ life experiences (Ryan, 1996). 
DCE is based on random utility theory, originated by Thurstone (1927), but theoretical 
foundations of choice experiments were laid out by Lancaster (1966). This has been introduced 
in economics by Marschak (1960), formalized by Manski (1977) and further maneuvered by 
McFadden (1974). Recent work in DCE theories and methods relies heavily on work by 
McFadden, who extended Thurstone’s original theory of paired comparisons (pairs of choice 
alternatives) to multiple comparisons, and, since its inception, it has been considerably 
developed and is now an important statistical method in various academic disciplines. 
In the current study, stated preference in the form of discrete choice experiments (DCEs) 
was used to identify and evaluate the relative importance of several contract attributes in 
farmers’ decision to participate in the CRP. 
Figure 3.1 represents the key stages of developing DCE. Every stage is important and, at 
each, researchers are required to select among different available approaches. Research 
objectives are the object of choice for which preference will be quantified. But, the most 
important aspect of DCE design is the identification of attribute levels that could illustrate a 
hypothetical situation efficiently. Attributes and levels are the individual features that comprise 
the research object, among which the survey will elicit tradeoffs. Attributes can be quantitative 
or qualitative. 
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Figure 3.1. Key stages for developing and analyzing a discrete-choice experiment 
Source: Johnson et al, 2013 
The choice question format describes how a series of sets of alternatives from among all 
possible profiles of attribute-level combinations will be presented to the respondent. Analytical 
requirements encompass information about the intended choice-model specifications. The 
attributes and levels, choice question format, and analysis requirements all form the basis for the 
experimental design, which is a process of generating specific combinations of attributes and 
levels that are to be evaluated by survey respondents. 
Data for choice questions are then analyzed to predict choice and produce estimated 
preference weights, or choice-model parameters, that are consistent with the observed pattern of 
choice by respondents (Statistical Analysis). The resulting estimates are then used to evaluate 
important factors related to the research objective. 
Research objective 
Attributes and level 
Experimental Design 
Data 
Choice 
Question 
Format 
Analysis 
Requirement 
Statistical Analysis 
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3.3. The Discrete Choice Design and Implementation 
The present study was formulated to evaluate farmers’ preferences for five hypothetical 
CRP contract attributes: 
i. Maximum payment (% of FSA-determined local county rental rates) 
ii. Terms of contract payment (fixed at start or re-adjusted every 5 years) 
iii. Length of the contract (10 or 15 years) 
iv. Establishment sharing  (50% or 100% government cost share) 
v. Land use restrictions (Idle or graze/hay every other year) 
Table 3.1 is an example of a choice set. Table 3.2 provides more detail on the different 
levels for each attribute. In this study, the choices of attributes and levels were identified based 
on a combination of evidence from literature, CRP program policies and benefits, farm bill 
provisions, and information from focus group discussions with county FSA directors. 
Table 3.1. An example of a choice set from the discrete choice experiment  
 
Option A  Option B  Option C 
 
Maxbid 
100 % 
 
Terms 
Readjusted at five years 
 
Length of contract 
15 years 
 
Establishment cost 
100 % 
 
Land use restriction 
Graze/hay permitted 
 
  
Maxbid 
120 % 
 
Terms 
Readjusted at five years 
 
Length of contract 
10 years 
 
Establishment cost 
50 % 
 
Land use restriction 
Idle only 
 
  
No contract 
 
Do not enroll in CRP 
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SAS software was used to generate 23 choice sets, representing a reduced orthogonal 
experiment design with a D-efficiency of 89%. Prior to conducting the survey, pre-tests of 
questionnaire and sample surveys were conducted with samples of farmers. On the basis of the 
given feedback, three different introductory videos were recorded along with the adjustments of 
the questionnaire’s wording to make sure that respondents fully understood the questions and the 
purpose of the study. 
Respondents were offered choice sets of 3 alternatives (option A, option B, and no 
contract as option C). Respondents were asked to rank these alternatives according to their 
preferences. Inclusion of the ‘opt out’ alternative (no contract) avoids a forced choice by 
allowing respondents to select neither alternative in the choice set and serves to make the results 
obtained consistent with demand theory ( Ruto and Garrod, 2009). 
Table 3.2. CRP attributes and levels used in choice experiments 
 
Study Attribute Description Attribute levels 
Max Bid (Contract Rental 
Rate) 
Percent of FSA county rental 
rate 
 80%, 100%, 120% 
Terms of Contract Payment The flexibility of the rental 
payment amount. 
Fixed in the beginning, 
Re-adjustment every 5 
years 
Length of the contract Duration of CRP contract 10, 15 years 
Establishment cost in the 
beginning  
The government share of cost to 
initiate the conservation 
practices 
50%, 100% 
Land use restrictions  Permitted uses of land Idle, graze/hay every 
other year 
 
3.4. Model Estimation 
In economic theory, discrete choice modeling is compliant with Lancaster’s consumer 
theory (Lancaster, 1966) and random utility theory (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974). Lancaster 
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consumer theory is based on the underlying assumption that what consumers are seeking to 
acquire is not goods themselves but the characteristics they contain, and these 
characteristics/attributes give rise to utility. 
Random utility theory decomposes utility into two parts: (i) a systematic component 
explained by the independent variables (or attributes), and (ii) a random component not 
explained by the attributes. This theory also assumes the utility maximization principle, i.e. if a 
respondent chooses one alternative over another, then the utility from the chosen alternative is 
greater than that of the unselected alternative. 
In this study, respondents were asked to rank the alternatives in each choice set, 
according to their preference order. To evaluate the individual’s choice in relation to different 
attributes and characteristics of a contract, an exploded logit model with no ties in ranking was 
used. In the economics literature, this is also known as rank-ordered logit model. This model is a 
generalization of the binomial logistic regression model, and was proposed by Beggs, Cardell, 
and Hausman (1981) and further extended by Hausman and Ruud (1987) with the name of rank- 
ordered logit model in the economics literature. The model was independently formulated by 
Punj and Staelin (1978) and Chapman and Staelin (1982) in the field of marketing with the name 
exploded-logit model. 
In the exploded-logit model, Yij—the rank given by a respondent to alternative j in choice 
set i—is the independent variable. Given J alternatives per choice set, Yij can take on any integer 
value between 1 and J, with 1 being the rank of the most-preferred alternative, and J the rank of 
the least-preferred. The indirect utility function (Vij) is a mapping function of the utility of option 
j in choice set i in as many dimensions as the choice sets have attributes. Vij is comprised of (i) a 
systematic component that is a function of the attributes of each alternative in the choice set and, 
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potentially, characteristic of the respondent completing choice set i (denoted μij) and (ii) an 
unexplained error component (denoted εij). The error terms are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed. Thus, the indirect utility of option j in choice set i is given by: 
 
Vij = μij + εij,  
 
(1) 
where μij is the systematic component relating utility to the attributes of the contract, decision 
maker, or both, and εij is the unexplained for option j in choice set i, which follows a Gumbel 
(aka double-exponential) distribution (Train, 2009). The systematic component of the indirect 
utility function can be expanded in various ways. The general model is as follows: 
Vij = βjxi +ϒzj  + θwij + εij,  
 
(2) 
where x, z, and w are column vectors of measured variables, and β, ϒ, and θ are row 
vectors of coefficients to be estimated. The xi vector contains variables that describe respondents 
but do not vary over options, and one of the βj vectors must be set as 0 to achieve identification 
(the choice of the references item is arbitrary). The zj vector contains variables that vary across 
options but are the same for respondents. The wij vector contains variables that describe a 
relation between i and j, i.e., interaction between characteristics of contracts and respondents’ 
variables (Allison and Christakis, 1994).  
In Equation 2, if ϒ and θ become 0 then the model is similar to the multinomial model, 
i.e. μij = βjxi , and if only θ is 0, a conditional logit model results. However, an exploded logit 
model was used because the rank order of J values may be regarded as an explosion into J-1 
independent observations, such that Ui1> Ui2 >. …> Uij give rise to (Ui1 > Uij, j=2,…., J) , (Ui2 > 
Uij, j=3, …., J),….( Ui(j-1) > Uij ) (Salomon, 2003). Hence, the data have been collected and 
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considered as a series in which respondents were asked to rank 1,2 and 3, for the all the choices 
according to their highest to lowest preference, respectively. 
This explosion is only possible because of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) assumption (also known as Luce’s choice axiom). In the IIA assumption, it is believed that 
the εij terms are independent of each other, although it depends on the part of external value 
distribution of ε terms (Allison and Christakis, 1994; Luce, 1959). In other words, introduction 
or elimination of a particular item or choice does not change the relative preference of the 
respondents. This assumption is very important, and there might be difficulty in either 
computation if this assumption is not made. However, this assumption is equally important in the 
multinomial logit model, where the respondent has to choose one item instead of ranking 
choices, but violation of this assumption is easily identifiable with ranked data because more 
information is available on relative preferences in terms of ranks. 
The exploded logit model is not reversible, in the sense that inverting the rank does not 
merely change the sign of coefficients (as it would in a dichotomous logit model or in a 
cumulative logit model) but fundamentally changes the model and its associated likelihood 
(Allison and Christakis, 1994).  
The random utility model implies the following likelihood Li for a single respondent  
 
      
        
             
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
(3)  
where δijk =1 if Yik  Yij, and 0 otherwise. The probability that a respondent will assign the 
highest rank to option j from among the J alternatives is 
     
 
  
    
 
   
. 
 
  (4)  
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After the first rank has been assigned, then the probability of assigning the next rank to 
alternative m item from the remaining alternatives is:  
     
   
      
   
   
. 
 
  (5) 
 
That is, the top-ranked alternative(s) is (are) assumed to be irrelevant to a respondent’s 
preference order for the remaining items, and this assumption is enforced by removing 
previously selected items. This continues through each step, so in the case of final choice, say, 
items r and s, the probability of choosing r is: 
     
   
       
. 
(6) 
 
3.5. Estimation of Exploded Logit Model 
Estimation of an exploded logit model is based on a maximum likelihood procedure that 
can easily be accomplished with most partial likelihood estimation procedures for proportional 
hazard models. For a sample of n independent respondents, equation (3) implies a log likelihood 
of 
         
 
   
                       
  
   
 
  
   
 
   
  
   
 
 
 
(7) 
In this likelihood function, Ji is allowed to vary across respondents. Also, we can 
substitute equation (2) in place of μij. Equation (7) is then maximized by iteratively changing the 
vectors of coefficients (βj, ϒ, and θ) and if a maximum is found it would be global maximum 
rather than a local maximum. (Allison and Christakis, 1994).  
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3.6. Validity Issues 
It is always possible for researchers to execute the consistency test to validate the 
subject’s response. As DCE tasks are cognitively challenging, where reliability of responses, 
along with theoretical principle, helps to identify whether the results from the survey are valid 
and accurate. Rational preferences must satisfy several axioms. Among these are completeness, 
transitivity, monotonicity, and continuity, which are commonly tested assumptions (Mengoni 
2013). Per Lancsar and Louviere (2006), the most essential of these axioms for the preference-
based view of rationality are transitivity and completeness.  
Nicholson and Snyder (2011) stated that this basic set of postulates, or axioms, helps in 
analyzing ‘rational behavior’. Completeness simply means that, given any pair of conceivable 
alternatives—either two baskets of consumption goods or two contracts with varied attributes—
the respondent can determine (1) which of the two is more desirable or (2) whether both are 
equally desirable. That is, an individual whose preferences are complete is capable of stating a 
preference order for any set of two or more alternatives. The transitivity assumption requires that 
an individual’s choices be internally consistent—i.e. for any options x, y, and z if x is preferable 
to y and y is preferable to z, then x must also be preferable to z.  
These axioms are very important for an analysis of rational behavior while applying 
DCEs. However, if respondents fail to follow these axioms, then it leads to a problem of what to 
do with such responses. Lancsar and Louviere (2006) argued that responses from these 
respondents might be valid, so removing responses would be inappropriate. Lancsar and 
Louviere (2006) argue that even if the marginal rate of substitution cannot be estimated, these 
preferences are still relevant for analyzing and interpreting effects on policy making. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
4.1. Choice Experiment Data Collection  
In this study, a convenience sample of 76 Prairie Pothole Region (PPR) farmers was 
interviewed in person during the spring, summer and fall of 2014. The PPR is a 197- county area 
in five
5
 states that contains approximately 3.8 million acres of CRP, representing 24% of the 
total CRP acres in the U.S. (as of 06/20/2014; USDA). The survey targeted both participants and 
non-participants in CRP selected by FSA directors in specific counties to represent a variety of 
producers, production systems and land types. So the data was collected from a convenience 
sample including a cross-section of farmers and ranchers within each county. Participants 
included those enrolled in CRP as well as those not enrolled. 
The choices of program attributes and levels were identified based on a combination of 
evidence from the literature, CRP program policies, farm bills and information from a focus 
group discussion with FSA and other USDA officials. SAS software was used to generate 23 
combinations for a three option choice set design, representing a reduced orthogonal experiment 
design with a D-efficiency of 89%. In each choice set, respondents were asked to rank 
alternatives as per their preference from ‘best’ to ‘worst’. Table 3.1 is an example of a choice set 
and Table 3.2 provides more detail on the different levels for each attribute. Apart from the 
choice experiment, participants were asked a variety of questions regarding characteristics of 
their farm, reasons for entry into a CRP contract, livestock and grazing potential, socio-
demographic characteristics, and what they like and dislike, and what kind of changes they 
would like to see in current CRP guidelines. The purpose was to identify important factors 
contributing to CRP-enrollment and re-enrollment decisions.  
                                                          
5
 PPR states IW, MT,MN,ND,SD 
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4.2. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample which included 76 farm 
operators. The average respondent was 54.2 years old—younger than the average age of US 
farmers which is 58.3 years (USDA, 2012 Census of Agriculture). Total farm distribution was 
skewed right, with a mean farm size of 3,666 acres and median of 2,500 acres. Average total 
arable land was 2,122 acres. Fifty-eight percent of participants have native grasses on their land 
and 47% raise cows on their farms. Wheat, corn and soybeans are the three most common crops 
                                                          
6
 Total cropland includes all the land that farmers operate.  
Table 4.1. Summary statistics of survey respondents (N= 76) 
 
Variable 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) Description 
Age 
54 .22 
(11) Age of farmer 
Total Farmland 
3,666 
(3,631) 
Total of farmland includes grass  land, acres 
covered under water, and all other marginal 
land (owned+ rented) 
Tillable Land 
2,122. 
(1,986) 
Tillable land out of all farmland (owned+ 
rented)
6
 
Completely 
Dependent on farm* 0.51 1= 100% of family income comes from farm 
Native Grasses 0.59 
1 = Farm includes native pasture or/and Idle 
grasses  
Livestock* 0.47 1= Farm Includes cow/calf herd 
CRP 0.67 1= Currently enrolled into CRP  
CRP Acres 
129 
(230) Number of acres currently enrolled in CRP 
 
Notes: One farmer had a swine operation and another raised chickens. These were coded as 0 
because they were raised in captivity. 
 
Mean of dummy variables represents the percentage of farms or farmers with this characteristic. 
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in participants’ rotations while alfalfa and grass hay are also common for operators with 
livestock.  
Sixty-seven percent of farmers were enrolled in at least one CRP contract and 48% said 
they intended to re-enroll their contracts. Seventy-seven percent of farmers are participating in 
one or more conservation programs apart from CRP. Eighty-five percent of participants have 
water bodies larger than two acres on their land. Forty-nine percent of participants’ households 
reported having some off-farm income that could be an important factor for those valuing the 
income stability associated with long-term land retirement programs. 
Table 3.2. Concern showed by respondents about CRP 
 
Details Percentage of farmers 
expressing this concern 
Payment limit under CRP 7% 
Different counties have different 
guidelines for maintaining CRP  5% 
Rigid and complex eligibility criteria to 
include new criteria for land previously 
enrolled into CRP 31% 
Administrative process or officials 
involved 41% 
Terms of the contract need to be changed 
69% 
Too many rules involved in 
implementation. 35% 
Benefits go to absentee landowners and 
farmers with large acreages 3% 
1= Restricts availability of land to young 
farmers / limits scope of expansion  29% 
 
Table 4.2 reports participants’ responses to an open-ended attitudinal statement. The 
percentage noted is that which indicated the concern about CRP. For example, payment limit 
represents the cap of maximum rent allowed, which is to be received by an individual every year 
Seven percent of respondents noted this concern. Different guidelines represent farmers’ 
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concerns about the different guidelines under the same program, especially within counties or in 
adjacent counties. Some respondents showed their concern about land which came out from the 
CRP being no longer eligible to be re-enrolled.  
Problems with the administration office or the administrative process such as filling 
paperwork for enrolling into the CPR program were noted as a concern by 41% of respondents. 
Terms of the contract were another major challenge raised by the respondents. They include the 
current program’s characteristics such as rental payment, penalties for early termination of 
contract, restrictions on farming, length of the contract, and midterm management contract. 
Rules implementation includes the respondents’ concerns about requirements to replace new 
grasses with old grasses, restrictions on cutting noxious weeds, and other rules related to planting 
new grasses. 
4.3. Estimation Results 
Each of the 76 farm operators ranked 23 choice sets; each consisting of three alternatives: 
two CRP contract options, and an opt-out or “no contract” option. Sixteen percent of the 
participants gave the highest rank to the opt-out option in every choice set indicating they are 
opposed to the CRP as defined in the attributes defined current program or it does not suit their 
farming operation. The regression results for the exploded logit model are shown in Appendix A. 
It includes alternative-specific constants for option 1 and option 2, which in have nearly identical 
negative coefficients that are statistically different from the opt-out alternative at the 1% 
significance level, but indistinguishable from each other even at the 90% significance level. This 
indicates that these two options are statistically different from the opt-out option. The negative 
signs of the alternative-specific constants indicate that, barring sufficient compensatory contract 
attributes; the survey participants will not enroll in the program. Interaction terms with 
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demographic variables were included in the analysis. The McFadden pseudo R
2 
(2) measures the 
goodness-of-fit and based on the model output 2 is 0.203 representing an extremely good model 
fit. As per Louviere et al. (2000), 2 could not be expected as high as   
  which is commonly 
obtained in many stated choice OLS applications. The primary reason is that the logistics 
regression model estimates maximum likelihood coefficients; so 2 cannot be calculated to 
minimize variance as in OLS models, instead it shows a proportion reduction in error variance. 
Although 2 is measured on the similar scale as R2, ranging from 0 to 1, it is calculated 
differently (Equation 8). 
    
                         
                      
 
(8) 
The log value of any likelihood value between 0 and 1 is lesser than or equal to zero. 
Also the log value of low likelihood value will have a larger magnitude than values of the log of 
better likelihood models; hence a smaller value of log likelihoods is a better fit and explains 
better goodness-of- fit of a logistic regression. 
The list of variables used in the analysis is presented in the Appendix B. The signs of the 
exploded logit coefficients are generally expected. The coefficient on ‘Maxbid’ is positive and 
strongly significant which represents that the higher the maximum bid rate (payment) is allowed, 
the more likely a farmer is to choose a CRP contract. The positive effect of higher rental rates 
decreases with increasing age of farmers, as illustrated by statistically discernible negative 
coefficient (-0.0003455) of the ‘age*maxbid’. Conversely, those farmers with concerns about the 
terms of the current contract and rules implementation are more responsive to an increase in the 
maxbid as shown by the positive coefficients for the related interaction terms ‘terms of 
contract*maxbid’ (0.00800) and ‘rules implementation*maxbid’ (0.00939). Increases in maxbid 
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have less of an effect on the likelihood of enrolling in CRP for farmers with concerns about the 
application process (-0.0127). 
The independent variable ‘Terms’ in the model represents the attribute defining if rental 
payments are fixed at the beginning of contracts or re-adjusted after every five years on the basis 
of market conditions. The flip side of market based adjustments was explained to respondents; 
specifically that if there is a bear market for cash rent and commodity prices then rental payment 
could also decrease. This variable is considered in three categories in the model: (a) terms of the 
contract fixed at start (Terms = 2); (b) terms of the contract readjust every five years (Terms = 
1); and (c) do not participate in the program (Terms = 0). Results show that the fixed rental rate 
at the beginning of the CRP contract has a tendency to reduce the probability of selecting a CRP 
alternative, which causes statistically diminishing effect (-0.96497) on the likelihood ratio of 
enrolling in CRP. Cross term ‘age*terms’ has a positive significant effect (0.01322) which 
indicates that as a landowner gets older they prefer to have the more restricted option of fixed 
payment for the life of the contract. Other cross terms such as ‘livestock*terms’, ‘different 
guidelines*terms’, ‘Eligibility*terms’, ‘application process* terms’, ‘rules 
implementation*terms’, and ‘terms of the contract*terms’ are statically insignificant. Contract 
term length diminishes the likelihood of participating in CRP alternatives (-0.11689) but positive 
effect (0.04259) interaction term between length and concern related to different eligibility 
criteria (eligibility*length) increases the incentive for landowners and therefore the likelihood 
(0.04259) they will choose the CRP alternative. However, the cross term between concerns with 
rules implementation and length of the contact ‘rules implementation *length’ reduces the 
likelihood of selecting CRP alternatives (-0. 07196). Interactions between ‘length’ and other 
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variables - age, livestock, different guidelines, eligibility, application process, and terms of the 
contract – do not have significant effect on the likelihood ratio of enrolling in a CRP contract. 
Land use is another variable with three categories in the model: (a) No usage of the land 
and it remains idle (land use = 2); (b) land can be used for grazing/haying every other year (land 
use = 1); and (c) do not participate in the program (Land use = 0).The negatively significant (-
2.08740) variable ‘land-use’ represents that requiring the land to be idle has negative effect on 
the likelihood of enrolling in CRP. Likewise, cross terms between land_use and livestock 
(livestock*land_use), and land_use and concerns regarding rules implementation (rules 
implementation *land_use) also have negative effects on the enrollment alternative. The reason 
could be that livestock farmers want to use their land more often to get feed for their livestock. 
Conversely, as the positive affect of ‘age*land_use’ (0.033793) shows that farmers prefer to 
have more restrictions on usage of land with an increasing age. We expected a higher level of 
establishment cost paid by the contract to increase likelihood of enrollment. All other cross 
variables with establishment cost such as age, livestock, different guidelines, eligibility, 
application process, rules implementation, terms of the current contract are insignificant. 
4.4. Probability of Enrollment Decisions and Willingness-to-Tradeoff (WTT) Decision 
Although signs and coefficients of different attributes and interaction terms indicate the 
effects of changes on the likelihood ratio of enrolling into a contract due to the changes in 
respective attributes, no direct inference could be concluded to strengthen any relationship 
among attributes of participation. A convenient and efficient way of making coefficients 
understandable is by computing marginal effects on utilities and marginal willingness to tradeoff 
(WTT) of policy attributes. This helps in better understanding the effect of change in a farmer’s 
preference due to a change in policy attributes in order to maintain the similar likelihood ratio. 
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For dummy variables, the discrete change in the probability of choosing CRP alternative (ceteris 
paribus) is evaluated by changing the dummy’s value from zero to one. Also, these WTT 
estimates represent the percentage monetary equivalent of increasing the attribute values by one 
unit. For example, a marginal WTT of 18.23 for the land use attribute represents (refer to Table 
4.3) that a landowner needs to be compensated by an increase of 18.23% in payment for a 
contract to have an equal utility when the contract moves from one allowing grazing/haying to 
one that requires land be idle. In other words, offering the farmers an extra 18.23% payment 
would restore the initial utility attained by enrolling into CRP contract before imposing this 
restriction. 
In this analysis, the impacts of various socio-economic factors on the probabilities of 
enrollment decisions are also evaluated. To investigate the possible source of variability in 
preference orders, mean value of age and mode (most commonly chosen) variables of utility 
parameters are used as a base contract, which is presented in table 4.3. Then, with the help of 
equation 9, the impact of these base contracts’ estimates on the probability of participation was 
quantified.  
         
            
              
 
(9) 
  
According to the results shown in Table 4.3, as a base case, suppose a 54.2 year old 
farmer, who does not have livestock and expressed issues related to the CRP program such as 
with different guidelines in different counties, eligibility criteria, application process, and terms 
of the contract, is offered a CRP contract with following contract specifications: 
1) 10-year long contract 
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2) 100% Maxbid  
3) Flexible terms of the contact 
4)  50% of establishment cost  
5) Grazing and haying allowed every other year.  
Then, his probability of accepting the contract is 0.8523. Table 4.3 also presents (i) variables of 
the base case, (ii) the impact of change in utility due to change in respective variable (iii) the 
impacts of change on probabilities due to the changes in various socio-economic factors, and (iv) 
estimates of the variables’ marginal effects on the likelihood of the ‘CRP’ alternative. 
Table 4.3. Discrete change in probability, marginal effect in utilities, and tradeoffs 
 
Variable Mean 
 
Marginal 
Effect on 
utilities 
Willingness 
to tradeoffs 
(WTT) w.r.t 
to Maxbid  
Probability of 
Participation 
Change in 
Probability  
AGE 54.2      0.0312***      -0.9096 0.8561  0.0039 
Livestock 0     -0.7948***      21.2840 0.7248 -.1274 
DG 1     -0.6111*      21.2527 0.7608 -0.0915 
Elig 1     -0.2594**        7.4889 0.8172 -0.351 
AP 1      0.8439*      18.3118 0.9302 0.0779 
RI 0     -0.1847        4.1906 0.8278 -0.0245 
TC 1     -0.7127*        5.7937 0.7396 -0.1127 
MaxBid 100      0.3468*** -- 0.8565  0.0042 
Terms 1      0.0973        2.8070 0.8390 -0.0133 
Length 10      0.0196       -0.5680 0.8548  0.0025 
Estb 50  0.0088***       -0.2544 0.8534  0.0011 
Land_Use 1     -0.6323**      18.2350 0.7547  -0.0976 
 
In the above table; *, **, *** represents significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively calculated by using Krinsky Robb method. To measure the significance level 
of change in utilities and its statistical impact on probability and willingness to tradeoff the 
Krinsky and Robb parametric bootstrapping method was used. “The Krinsky Robb approach is 
parametric bootstrap procedure and involves simulating multiple draws from the distribution of 
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structural parameters. One of the biggest assumptions of applying Krinsky and Robb’s method is 
that it usually assumes normality of the parameter estimates, as well as the normality of their 
ratio” (Carson and Czajkowsk, 2013, p.10) 
In general sign-up, CRP contracts are accepted depending on a bid submitted. Once 
approved, landowners receive payments based on the submitted bids. Tradeoffs are considered 
and calculated with respect to maxbix (rental payments). However, change in maxbid has a 
positive impact on the probability of enrollment. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the maxbid by 
1% would increase the likelihood of enrollment by .39%. When the contract changes for the 
more flexible readjustment after 5 years to fixed at start for life of the contract (terms) there is a 
negative impact on probability. Fixing payment at the beginning of the contract would reduce the 
likelihood of participation by 13.3%ceteris paribus.  
Table 4.3 shows that, on average, producers are willing to trade off flexibility in terms of 
the contract with an increase in maxbid of 2.81% in order to maintain the initial utility. The 
probability of respondents’ participation decision into CRP program would increase by .25% for 
each year increase in contract length. Ceteris Paribus, farmers are willing to take a 5.7% 
reduction in maxbid for an additional year on the contract (retaining utility). Results also show 
that an increase in the government share of the establishment cost by 1% would only increase the 
probability of participation decision by .0011. However, the WTT of this variable states to 
maintain equal level of utility; for an additional 1% establishment cost, farmers are willing to 
accept a payment (bid rate) cut of nearly .25%. 
Interestingly, the elasticity of the probability with respect to land use restriction is found 
to be relatively high (-0.0976). An increase in the restriction on land usage would reduce the 
probability of farmers’ participation in the CRP by 0.0976. This result is consistent with 
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literature examining the importance of land usage to farmers (Cooper and Osborn, 1998; 
Langpap 2006). The idle cropland and restrictions on farming on land enrolled in CRP may be an 
indicator of the environmental sensitivity of that region but, on average, this restriction increases 
the opportunity costs of participation in CRP. As explained previously, the WTT estimate of 
18.23 for ‘land use’ means that farmers are willing to accept more restrictions on usage of 
enrolled land with an increase in max bid by 18.23%. This result seems reasonable because more 
restriction on usage of land would increase the opportunity costs by making their farm lands idle. 
In terms of socio-economic factors, older farmers are expected to participate more in the 
CRP. This is reflected in the WTT estimate for variable ‘Age’. First, according to the results 
shown in Appendix A, an increase in the variable age by one year would increase the probability 
of enrollment into CRP program to 0.8561. An additional payment cut by .91% of maxbid is 
required to restore the utilities. However, farmers with livestock operations face a highly 
inelastic effect on the probability of enrollment. These findings suggest that if the farmers with 
livestock operations are being offered the base contract, the chances of enrolling decision would 
be 12.74% less than for those who don’t operate livestock, ceteris paribus. To compensate 
livestock farmers, an additional 21.28% of max bid is required as shown by WTT estimate.  
This analysis also examines the impacts of various concerns raised by farmers related to 
existing characteristics of the contracts. Based on the results, any difference in guidelines, 
especially between adjacent counties, inconsistent eligibility criteria, rules implemented for 
midterm management, and characteristics of the current program have a negative effect on the 
probability of enrollment. The respective changes in probabilities of these factors are -0.0915, -
0.351, -0.0245 and -0.1127. As shown by WTT estimates, an additional 21.25% and 7.5 % 
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payment are required to compensate farmers who had an issue with the different guidelines or 
inconsistent eligibility criteria, respectively, to maintain constant utility.  
Concerns about midterm management rules reduce the probability of participation in 
CRP. Offering an increase of 4.2% in maxbid would compensate farmers for their concern about 
midterm management rules; i.e., it would return their utility back to that expected for farmers 
without this concern. Concerns about changes in existing terms have a negative impact on 
likelihood of enrolling in CRP. An increase of 5.7% in maxbid will compensate for these 
concerns. 
Farmers’ concern related to the application process for enrolling into CRP and dealing 
with the FSA officials were represented by AP (application process) estimates. An improvement 
in issues related to the application process would increase the participation decision by 7.8%. 
Results also shows that farmers are ready to accept payment cut by 18.31% to either avoid hassle 
involved with ‘AP’ or have some improvements regarding application process.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
49 
 
CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE REFRENCES 
Land retirement programs have a long history in the United States. Started in the 1930s, 
with the downturn of commodity prices, the objectives of th ese programs have evolved with 
passing years. By 1985, the primary focus of these programs shifted more towards emphasizing 
conservation. Although, the CRP has evolved after almost 30 years of existence, it still maintains 
support among conservation and agricultural communities.  
From farmers’ perspectives, CRP is more beneficial than other land retirement programs 
because it is voluntary, doesn’t require permanent easements or transfer of property rights, 
provides fixed income and other financial support, and has the potential of controlling 
commodity prices by reducing supplies (Ferris and Siikamäki, 2009). However, highly 
fluctuating commodity prices have negatively affected participants’ decisions to enroll into this 
and other land retirement programs. In fact, CRP acreage was reduced by 17.1 million acres 
between FY2007 and FY2014 (Stubbs, 2014). Reduction in acres reduces budgetary pressures, 
but it also has inevitable environmental consequences because land coming out from CRP is 
generally more environmentally-sensitive land  
Some of the major factors which might be responsible for this reduction are changes in 
program priorities, advancement of farming technologies, and changes in producer’s preferences 
due to availability of various alternative subsidy-based programs. However, evidence strongly 
suggests that the most important factor has been the unprecedented increase in commodity prices 
and subsequent increase in income from farming.  
This study discussed findings from the literature regarding the impact on CRP enrollment 
of changes in commodity prices. Hellerstein and Malcolm (2011), Gill‐Austern (2011), and 
Secchi and Babcock (2007) studied the impact of rising commodity prices on the CRP 
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enrollment decision. These studies identified a negative correlation between commodity prices 
and CRP enrollment. They also mentioned that if commodity prices remain high, landowners 
would start taking land out from CRP contracts and start bringing their land back into 
production. These studies focused only on the economic impact between high commodity prices 
and CRP enrollment. There is no evidence in these studies about how current characteristics of 
the CRP program affect landowners’ enrollment decision.  
This report also considered literature profiling producers enrolled in CRP. Lambert and 
Sullivan (2006) and subsequent papers offered the only research reviewed with the specific 
objective of identifying factors contributing to CRP participation. Lambert and Sullivan found 
the presence of a land retirement program to be directly related with land ownership and the 
presence of highly erodible land and negatively related with production of high value crops. 
They found the percentage of land enrolled in a land retirement program to be negatively related 
to the presence of a grain crop and positively related to farm ownership, participation in other 
government programs, and the female gender.  
On basis of similar consideration, this study was conducted to provide insight into the 
attributes which influence farmers’ preference for participating into CRP by developing and 
analyzing hypothetical choice sets. The other purpose of this study was to identify the extent to 
which farmers are willing to tradeoff rental rates for more favorable scheme requirements. The 
focus is on the PPR region which helped to provide insight for a region where potential impact 
and efficacy of conservation programs on environment is highly important. 
A stated preference discrete choice experiment was completed during in person 
interviews with 76 farmers during the spring, summer and fall of 2014. While conducting 
interviews, respondents were asked to rank the choices as per their preference order. These 
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choices were evaluated using an exploded logit model. Forty-one percent of farmers expressed 
their concerns regarding the application process or with its management, and sixty-nine percent 
with contract terms. Twenty-nine percent reported the belief that land retirement schemes are an 
easy source of income and that lots of absentee owners and farmers with large acreages put 
significant land under such schemes; subsequently restraining the ability of young farmers to 
acquire their own land or expand.  
A number of factors that were assumed to be important for affecting farmers’ preferences 
were included in the model. The choice experiment revealed that payment, length of the contract, 
and land use restrictions are the most influential factors associated with the likelihood of 
farmer’s enrollment; consistent with the literature.  
As per the base case (Table 4.3), on average, age of the farmers, rental payment, terms of 
the contract, length of the contract, and establishment cost paid by the government have a 
positive effect on the likelihood a farmer will enroll in CRP and more restrictions on the usage of 
enrolled land have a negative effect. Farmers with livestock operations are less likely to enroll 
under the base case. A majority of farmers have concerns about one or more  characteristics of 
the program, such as different guidelines for maintenance of CRP-enrolled land in different 
counties, inconsistent eligibility criteria, rules for mid-term management, and current terms of 
the contract. These concerns have a negative effect on farmer's likelihood of enrolling in CRP. A 
concern about the application process has a positive effect on the farmers’ likelihood of enrolling 
into CRP program. 
This study also found that farmers are willing to trade-off program attributes for higher 
rental payments. We acknowledge that tradeoffs of preferences and specific requirements are 
indeed case specific. As a consequence, the robustness of these tradeoffs needs to be more 
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explicitly examined. Nevertheless, the detailed focus on individual preference for the desired 
contract requirements through the use of choice experiments provides a new way to consider the 
kind of changes desired in the current rules and restrictions of this program. 
 The results most directly relevant to policy include: 1) haying and grazing allowances as 
an important factor for the farmers, particularly those with cow/calf operations; 2) if the rental 
payment can be assessed and adjusted periodically based on prevailing market conditions (we 
considered after every five 5 years in this study), farmers would be more encouraged to stay in 
the contract for a longer period; 3) rental rate is one of the most significant factors for 
influencing a farmer’s decision to participate in the program. A well-targeted increase in rental 
rates may help meet program objectives; and 4) farmers have issues related to the policy and 
management of the program which might influence their willingness to participate. These 
fundamental barriers if reconciled could increase farmers’ interest in the program.  
This study also has some limitations to be addressed in future work. First, the findings 
should be generalized only with caution due in part to limitations associated with stated 
preferences methodology. In stated-preference studies, respondents may overstate required 
benefits (hypothetical bias). In the present study, we worked to reduce hypothetical bias by 
explaining each policy attribute and difference in the categories in person and including in the 
description references to current CRP policies that farmers are familiar with and by asking 
respondents to rank the choices instead of selecting the best suitable option. A second limitation 
is that the population was a convenience sample. Farmers were selected by FSA directors in 
specific counties to represent a variety of producers, production systems and land types. This 
convenience sample may be more interested in CRP then the average farmer. Using a random 
sample would increase confidence in reliability of the results. Third, on the basis of Ruto and 
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Garrod (2009), this study also predicted (like others) that by allowing higher payments, the 
government can enforce longer and more restrictive contracts but this does not mean lesser rent 
or financial incentive is required by some farmers to enroll into shorter and less restrictive 
contracts. Different farmers have different attribute preferences; different trade-off preferences 
and opportunity costs could also differ on the basis of region, size of the farm and other factors. 
Further research is required to identify the correlation between tradeoffs and the opportunity cost 
of participation.  
With those limitations in mind, findings of this study provide valuable information for 
future policies. Regardless of these findings, in a voluntary context, it is important for the 
success of the land retirement programs that they be profitable enough to motivate farmers to 
participate. Looking at the land use restrictions (or other requirements) in this study, the benefits 
have not been measured in terms of participation rate but rather in looking at how easing those 
restrictions would impact program participation.  
Based on findings from this study, some suggestions can be drawn for policy options that 
may increase farmers’ willingness to participate. The research suggests it is important to remove 
farmers’ basic concerns and issues related to CRP. One of the best possible ways is to focus on 
providing education to farmers about the program and its effectiveness. Also, farmers generally 
evaluate participation decisions on the basis of monetary incentives or on the basis of 
profitability.  But, an increase in the rental payment can put an extra burden on the agency 
budgets. Allowing haying and grazing (or some environmental friendly alternative use) on CRP 
lands could reduce the opportunity cost of the farmers and make participation in the CRP a more 
competitive option.  
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In this study focus was on how farmers preferred the characteristics of a program but 
analyzing or finding its impact on the environment or the cost-effectiveness of doing so through 
land retirement programs is another challenge for future studies.  
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APPENDIX A. RESULTS OF EXPLODED LOGIT ESTIMATION 
 
Criterion 
Without With 
Covariates Covariates 
-2 LOG L 5430.417 4326.23 
AIC 5430.417 4410.23 
SBC 5430.417 4679.945 
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square 
DF Pr > ChiSq 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
1104.187 42 <.0001 
Score 974.693 42 <.0001 
Wald 770.2361 42 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter 
Paramete 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Hazard 
Ratio 
opt1 -1.75308 0.34445 25.903 <.0001 0.173 
opt2 -1.67025 0.3454 23.384 <.0001 0.188 
Maxbid 0.05217 0.01022 26.062 <.0001 1.054 
Age*Maxbid -0.0003455 0.000154 5.0198 0.0251 1 
Livestock*Maxbid 0.00315 0.00327 0.9282 0.3353 1.003 
Different 
guidelines*Maxbid 
0.00579 0.00553 1.0983 0.2946 1.006 
Eligibility*Maxbid -0.0001936 0.00326 0.0035 0.9527 1 
application process*Maxbid -0.01266 0.00327 15.029 0.0001 0.987 
Rules 
Implementation*Maxbid 
0.00939 0.00333 7.932 0.0049 1.009 
Terms of contract*Maxbid 0.008 0.00368 4.721 0.0298 1.008 
Terms -0.96497 0.36001 7.1845 0.0074 0.381 
Age*Terms 0.01322 0.00545 5.8909 0.0152 1.013 
Livestock*Terms 0.04541 0.11615 0.1528 0.6958 1.046 
Different guidelines*Terms 0.08721 0.19017 0.2103 0.6465 1.091 
Eligibility*Terms 0.00584 0.11644 0.0025 0.96 
1.006 
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Parameter 
 
Paramete 
Estimate 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Chi-
Square 
 
Pr > ChiSq 
 
Hazard 
Ratio 
application process*Terms -0.00693 0.11669 0.0035 0.9526 0.993 
Rules 
Implementation*Terms 
0.07653 0.11614 0.4342 0.51 1.08 
Terms of contract*Terms 0.00726 0.13144 0.0031 0.9559 1.007 
Length -0.11689 0.07038 2.7583 0.0968 0.89 
Age*Length 0.00151 0.00106 2.0293 0.1543 1.002 
Livestock*Length -0.00991 0.02262 0.1919 0.6613 0.99 
Different guidelines*Length 0.01236 0.03704 0.1113 0.7387 1.012 
Eligibility*Length 0.04259 0.02268 3.5279 0.0603 1.044 
application process*Length 0.02007 0.02262 0.7878 0.3748 1.02 
Rules 
Implementation*Length 
-0.07196 0.02308 9.7204 0.0018 0.931 
Terms of contract*Length -0.00961 0.02581 0.1387 0.7096 0.99 
Establishment 0.00297 0.00812 0.1334 0.7149 1.003 
Age*Establishment 0.0000433 0.000123 0.1234 0.7254 1 
Livestock*Establishment 0.00194 0.00266 0.5299 0.4667 1.002 
Different 
guidelines*Establishment 
-0.00174 0.00441 0.1565 0.6924 0.998 
Eligibility*Establishment 0.0008253 0.00267 0.0957 0.7571 1.001 
application 
process*Establishment 
0.00217 0.00267 0.6622 0.4158 1.002 
Rules 
Implementation*Establishm
ent 
0.00104 0.0027 0.1466 0.7018 1.001 
Terms of 
contract*Establishment 
-0.0008874 0.00303 0.0858 0.7695 0.999 
Land_use -2.0874 0.42929 23.643 <.0001 0.124 
Age*Land_use 0.03331 0.00654 25.921 <.0001 1.034 
Livestock*Land_use -1.09213 0.1404 60.51 <.0001 0.336 
Different 
guidelines*Land_use 
-0.0527 0.2402 0.0481 0.8263 0.949 
Eligibility*Land_use -0.21588 0.14021 2.3709 0.1236 0.806 
application 
process*Land_use 
0.01497 0.13981 0.0115 0.9147 1.015 
Rules 
Implementation*Land_use 
-0.5203 0.14202 13.422 0.0002 0.594 
Terms of 
contract*Land_use 
0.12324 0.15859 0.6039 0.4371 1.131 
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APPENDIX B. DETAIL OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THIS STUDY 
 
Parameter Terms Details  Variables 
opt1   Contract option A   
opt2   Contract option B    
Maxbid   
Payment/ Rent (tied to local 
county's rental rate) 
80%, 100%, and 
120% of the FSA 
county rental rate 
amaxbid Age*maxbid 
Interaction term between age 
and maxbid 
  
lmaxbid Livestock*maxbid 
Interaction term between 
livestock and maxbid 
1 = Includes 
cow/calf herd 
dgmaxbid 
Different 
guidelines*maxbid 
Interaction term between 
different guidelines and 
maxbid 
1= Different 
counties have 
different 
guidelines for 
maintaining CRP  
Emaxbid Eligibility*maxbid 
Interaction term between 
eligibility and maxbid 
1= Rigid and 
complex 
eligibility criteria 
to include new 
criteria for land 
previously 
enrolled into CRP 
apmaxbid 
Application 
Process*Maxbid 
Interaction term between 
application process and 
maxbid 
1= Administrative 
process or 
officials involved 
rimaxbid 
Rules 
Implementation*Ma
xbid 
Interaction term between 
rules implementation and 
maxbid 
1= Terms of the 
contract need to 
be changed 
tcmaxbid 
Terms of 
contract*maxbid 
Interaction term between 
terms of contarct and maxbid 
1= Too many 
rules involved in 
implementation. 
Terms   
Terms of the contract 1 = Re-
adjustment every 
5 years 
2= Fixed at start 
aterms Age*terms 
Interaction term between age 
and Terms 
  
lterms Livestock*terms 
Interaction term between 
livestock and Terms 
1 = Includes 
cow/calf herd 
64 
 
Parameter Terms Details  Variables 
dgterms 
Different 
guidelines*terms 
Interaction term between 
different guidelines and 
Terms 
1= Different 
counties have 
different 
guidelines for 
maintaining CRP  
Eterms Eligibility*terms 
Interaction term between 
eligibility and Terms 
1= Rigid and 
complex 
eligibility criteria 
to include new 
criteria for land 
previously 
enrolled into CRP 
apterms 
Application 
Process*terms 
Interaction term between 
application process and 
Terms 
1= Administrative 
process or 
officials involved 
riterms 
Rules 
Implementation*ter
ms 
Interaction term between 
rules implementation and 
Terms 
1= Terms of the 
contract needs to 
be changed 
Tcterms 
Terms of 
contract*terms 
Interaction term between 
terms of contract and Terms 
1= Too many 
rules involved in 
implementation. 
Length   
Duration of the contract 10 Years and 15 
years 
alength Age*length 
Interaction term between age 
and Length 
  
llength Livestock*length 
Interaction term between 
livestock and Length 
1 = Farmers 
Includes cow/calf 
herd 
dglength 
Different 
guidelines*length 
Interaction term between 
different guidelines and 
Length 
1= Different 
counties have 
different 
guidelines for 
maintaining CRP  
Elength Eligibility*length 
Interaction term between 
eligibility and Length 
1= Rigid and 
complex 
eligibility criteria 
to include new 
criteria for land 
previously 
enrolled into CRP 
aplength 
Application 
Process*length 
Interaction term between 
application process and 
Length 
1= Administrative 
process or 
officials involved 
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Parameter Terms Details  Variables 
rilength 
Rules 
Implementation*len
gth 
Interaction term between 
rules implementation and 
Length 
1= Terms of the 
contract needs to 
be changed 
tclength 
Terms of 
contract*length 
Interaction term between 
terms of contract and Length 
1= Too many 
rules involved in 
implementation. 
Establishment   
Establishment Cost share of 
government 
50%, and 100% 
government share 
of establishment 
cost 
aestablishment Age*establishment 
Interaction term between age 
and Establishment 
  
lestablishment 
Livestock*establish
ment 
Interaction term between 
livestock and Establishment 
1 = Farmers 
Includes cow/calf 
herd 
dgestablishment 
Different 
guidelines*establish
ment 
Interaction term between 
different guidelines and 
Establishment 
1= Different 
counties have 
different 
guidelines for 
maintaining CRP  
Eestablishment 
Eligibility*establish
ment 
Interaction term between 
eligibility and Establishment 
1= Rigid and 
complex 
eligibility criteria 
to include new 
criteria for land 
previously 
enrolled into CRP 
apestablishment 
Application 
Process*establishm
ent 
Interaction term between 
application process and 
Establishment 
1= Administrative 
process or 
officials involved 
riestablishment 
Rules 
Implementation*est
ablishment 
Interaction term between 
rules implementation and 
Establishment 
1= Terms of the 
contract needs to 
be changed 
tcestablishment 
Terms of 
contract*establishm
ent 
Interaction term between 
terms of contract and 
Establishment 
1= Too many 
rules involved in 
implementation. 
Land_use   
Allowed usage of land 
enrolled into CRP for Haying 
and/or grazing 
1= Allowed every 
alternate year, 2= 
Not allowed at all 
and enrolled land 
will remain Idle 
aland_use Age*land_use 
Interaction term between age 
and Land_use 
  
66 
 
Parameter Terms Details  Variables 
lland_use Livestock*land_use 
Interaction term between 
livestock and Land_use 
1 = Farmers 
Includes cow/calf 
herd 
dgland_use 
Different 
guidelines*land_use 
Interaction term between 
different guidelines and 
Land_use 
1= Different 
counties have 
different 
guidelines for 
maintaining CRP  
Eland_use Eligibility*land_use 
Interaction term between 
eligibility and Land_use 
1= Rigid and 
complex 
eligibility criteria 
to include new 
criteria for land 
previously 
enrolled into CRP 
apland_use 
Application 
Process*land_use 
Interaction term between 
application process and 
Land_use 
1= Administrative 
process or 
officials involved 
riland_use 
Rules 
Implementation*lan
d_use 
Interaction term between 
rules implementation and 
Land_use 
1= Terms of the 
contract needs to 
be changed 
tcland_use 
Terms of 
contract*land_use 
Interaction term between 
terms of contract and 
Land_use 
1= Too many 
rules involved in 
implementation. 
 
